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Abstract
The additivity of classical probabilities is only the first in a
hierarchy of possible sum-rules, each of which implies its succes-
sor. The first and most restrictive sum-rule of the hierarchy yields
measure-theory in the Kolmogorov sense, which physically is appro-
priate for the description of stochastic processes such as Brownian
motion. The next weaker sum-rule defines a generalized measure
theory which includes quantum mechanics as a special case. The
fact that quantum probabilities can be expressed “as the squares
of quantum amplitudes” is thus derived in a natural manner, and
a series of natural generalizations of the quantum formalism is de-
lineated. Conversely, the mathematical sense in which classical
physics is a special case of quantum physics is clarified. The present
paper presents these relationships in the context of a “realistic” in-
terpretation of quantum mechanics.
An attitude toward Quantum Mechanics which is suitable for quantum gravity
in general, and for its application to cosmology in particular, is not so easy to find.
Understanding the early universe requires us to reason about a time in the distant
past in which observers in the ordinary sense of the word can hardly have been
present. For such a situation, a philosophically “realistic” attitude toward quantum
mechanics would seem to be more effective than one based on operators which must
find their physical meaning in terms of “measurements”. If the reality in question
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is taken to be something with a “spacetime” character (such as a Lorentzian 4-
geometry, or some more fundamental discrete structure like a causal set) *, then
the simplest description of its dynamics will be directly in terms of probabilities
of spacetime alternatives, rather than indirectly in terms of operators and Hilbert
spaces. For this reason, the mathematics of the “sum-over-histories” is more akin to
measure theory than to (say) lattice theory or the theory ofW ∗-algebras. Quantum
dynamics in such a formulation appears as a kind of generalization of the theory of
stochastic processes, rather than (directly) of classical mechanics.
To an untutored mind, however, the formal rules of the path-integral scheme,
could seem unnatural and contrived. Why are probabilities squares of amplitudes;
why are they expressed most naturally in terms of pairs of paths rather than indi-
vidual paths? (cf. [3] [4] [5] [6]) We will see that a possible answer to this question
emerges if one places quantum mechanics in a still more general context by asking
whether quantum probabilities preserve any of the additivity of classical ones. Let
us begin by considering, not the ubiquitous two-slit diffraction experiment, but a
generalization which I will call the three-slit experiment.
The three-slit experiment
Imagine an experiment in which an electron (say) passes through any one of
three slits and impinges on an array of detectors. Imagine that you record the
diffraction pattern with all three slits open, and then repeat the procedure with
some of the slits blocked off. In all, you can obtain in this way a total of eight
diffraction patterns. Now superimpose the eight patterns, using a plus sign when
an odd number (3 or 1) of the slits were open, and a minus sign when an even
number (2 or 0) were open. What will be the result? Remarkably, you will always
* Quantum gravity seems to demand a “spacetime approach” for more than one rea-
son, including the need to incorporate topology-change [1], and the evident impos-
sibility of making sense of continuous Hamiltonian evolution for a discrete structure
such as a causal set (for the latter see e.g. [2]).
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get zero, as can be straightforwardly demonstrated. Were the electron a classical
particle, you would also get zero, since each of the three slits would contribute
twice with a positive sign and twice with a negative one. In this sense, quantum
randomness preserves something of the classical additivity of probabilities.
One can go further and imagine diffraction experiments with four or more slits.
For each case beyond two slits the analogous superposition will again yield zero, but
it turns out that these subsequent relations yield nothing new, each of them being
logically contained in the three slit relation. I will describe this hierarchy of sum-
rules more carefully below, but first I want to sketch the interpretive framework in
which I would propose to situate them.
“Quantum materialism” and the quantum measure
In accord with the above introductory remarks, we do not want to base the
interpretation of the generalized probabilities we will be dealing with on some un-
defined concept of “measurements made by human observers”. Instead I would
propose a framework in which the ontology or “kinematics” and the dynamics or
“laws of motion” are as sharply separated * from each other as they are in classical
physics (see [5] [4] [7]). In fact I will take the attitude that the ontology of quantum
mechanics is identical to that of classical realism (in a spacetime mode), according
to which the world is a single “history”. How this “history” is actually structured is
for science to find out, and the chosen kinematics has varied from theory to theory.
According to the choice one has made, the world might be described as a collec-
tion of world lines, a spacetime-geometry (= diffeomorphism equivalence class of
Lorentzian metrics), a causal set, or something else. But in any case, all meaningful
statements of fact can by assumption be reduced to assertions about this one existing
* a separation which, presumably, must be overcome by the further development
of physical theory.
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history. Notions such as state-vectors and observables never appear, except for the
sake of computational convenience. *
Where quantum theory differs from classical mechanics (in this view) is in its
dynamics, which of course is stochastic rather than deterministic. As such, the
theory functions by furnishing probabilities for sets of histories. More formally, it
associates to a set A of histories a non-negative real number |A|, which I will call
its quantum measure |A|; and it is this measure that enters into the sum-rules we
will be concerned with.
In the two-slit experiment, for example, the probability that a particular de-
tector will register the arrival of the electron is (proportional to) the measure |C| of
the set C of all electron world lines which in fact pass close enough to that detector
to trigger it. When we contemplate also blocking off one or the other slit, there are
(for a fixed detector) three sets of histories to consider: the set A of histories which
arrive at the detector after traversing the “first” slit, the corresponding set B for
the “second” slit, and the original set C = A∐B, the disjoint † union of A and B.
It is of course characteristic of quantum probability that the interference term
I(A,B) := |A∐B| − |A| − |B|
between the slits is not zero. The surprising thing (once one has gotten used to the
fact of interference itself) is that this violation of the classical probability sum-rules
is in a certain sense so mild, since the corresponding sum-rule for three alternatives
remains valid.
* The account just given leaves open the question whether the history should be
thought of as existing “timelessly” like a painting, with the entire future already
laid out, or as a developing, incomplete thing which “grows at its tips like a tree”. I
personally believe the latter, but nothing in the discussion which follows will require
that a choice be made.
† ignoring the possibility that the electron’s trajectory winds around in such a
manner as to go through both slits.
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In any case, the important thing from the standpoint of interpretation is that
the electron follows one and only one path, not somehow two at once. If probabilities
are involved, it is only because the path is not determined in advance, just as it is
initially undetermined in a classical stochastic process.
Given the failure of the sum rule I(A,B) = 0, it is clear that quantum prob-
abilities cannot be interpreted in the same manner that classical ones are wont to
be interpreted, in terms of (actual or fictitious) ensemble frequencies. How they
should be interpreted is a question to which I will return briefly below, and more
at length in another place [8]. Here, my main purpose is to discuss the sum-rules
themselves.
Quantum measure theory and its generalizations
What ordinarily makes it difficult to regard quantum mechanics as in essence a
modified form of probability theory, is the peculiar fact that it works with complex
“amplitudes” rather than directly with probabilities, the former being more like
square roots of the latter. To put this peculiarity in context, consider the following
series of symmetric set-functions, which generalize the interference term I(A,B)
introduced above. (Notice that all the sets A, B, C · · ·which occur here are mutually
disjoint.)
I1(A) ≡ |A|
I2(A,B) ≡ |A∐B| − |A| − |B|
I3(A,B,C) ≡ |A∐B ∐ C| − |A∐B| − |B ∐ C| − |A∐C| + |A|+ |B|+ |C|,
or in general,
In(A1, A2, · · · , An) ≡ |A1 ∐A2 ∐ · · ·An|
−
∑
|(n− 1)sets|+
∑
|(n− 2)sets| · · ·
±
n∑
j=1
|Aj| (1)
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These expressions are related sequentially in a simple manner expressed by the
following lemma, whose straightforward inductive proof will be given elsewhere.
Lemma In+1(A0, A1, A2, · · · , An) = In(A0∐A1, A2, · · · , An)−In(A0, A2, · · · , An)−
In(A1, A2, · · · , An)
For each n one obtains a possible sum-rule by setting In to zero. It is an
immediate consequence of the lemma that the nth such sum-rule entails the (n+1)st.
Hence the sum-rules form a hierarchy of ever decreasing strength. The first sum-rule
in the hierarchy, I1 = 0, trivializes the measure and is therefore uninteresting. The
second expresses precisely the additivity of classical measure theory, or equivalently
the additivity of classical probabilities, when they are regarded as set-measures in
the Kolmogorov manner. Accordingly, the third sum-rule, I3(A,B,C) ≡ 0, defines a
generalization of measure theory which preserves most, but not all, of the additivity
of classical probabilities. This is the level of quantum measure theory. The fourth
and higher sum-rules define still more general forms of measure theory, which may
be regarded as natural extensions of quantum mechanics.
A second immediate consequence of the lemma is the fact that In+1 vanishes
if and only if In is “additive” in each argument, given the mutual disjointness of
all its arguments. Thus each sum-rule is associated with a kind of multilinear-
ity (really multi-additivity) of the function which measures the failure of the next
stronger sum-rule to hold. At the quantum level, specifically, we learn that I2 is
bi-additive, and we will see that the peculiar quadratic relationship between quan-
tum amplitudes and probabilities corresponds directly to this feature of I2. In the
next generalization beyond the quantum level, tri-additivity would take the place
of bi-additivity and (insofar as something like a quantum state-space were relevant
at all) some sort of trilinear form associated to I3 would presumably replace the
familiar inner product of quantum Hilbert space. In what follows, however we will
limit ourselves to the quantum case as defined by the n = 3 sum-rule,
|A∐B ∐ C| − |A∐B| − |B ∐C| − |A∐ C|+ |A|+ |B|+ |C| = 0. (2)
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Given this sum-rule, we can, as just pointed out, conclude immediately from
the lemma that I2 is bi-additive in the sense that
I(A∐B,C) = I(A,C) + I(B,C), (3)
whenever A, B and C are mutually disjoint. (Henceforth, I will usually omit the
subscript ‘2’ from ‘I2’.) Full bi-additivity of I, however would require this same
equality even when C overlaps A or B, a situation in which I has not even been
defined. This raises the obvious question whether we can extend the definition of
I(A,B) to general arguments in such a way as to preserve its bi-additivity.
Supposing such an extension to have been made, consider the combination
I(A∐B,A∐B). Expanding it out via bi-additivity and rearranging, we find that,
for disjoint subsets A and B,
2 I(A,B) = I(A∐B,A∐B)− I(A,A)− I(B,B),
which, on comparison with the defining equation for I2, strongly suggests the iden-
tification
I(X,X) = 2 |X |. (4)
If we adopt this as the value of I on equal arguments, then its value for arbitrary ar-
guments is completely determined by bi-additivity; and a short computation which
will appear elsewhere confirms that the resulting definition of I(A,B) is self consis-
tent. The end result is that I can be expressed in terms of the quantum measure
| · | in several equivalent forms, of which two are the following.
I(A,B) = |A ∪B|+ |A ∩B| − |A\B| − |B\A|, (5)
I(A,B) = |A∆B|+ |A|+ |B| − 2 |A\B| − 2 |B\A|.
(In these equations the symbol ‘\’ denotes set-theoretic difference and ‘∆’ denotes
symmetric difference.)
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We thus conclude that any generalized measure obeying the quantum sum rule
(2) can be expressed in the form |X | = I(X,X)/2, where I is the bi-additive, real-
valued set function of (5). Conversely, we could begin with such a set-function
whose diagonal values are all non-negative, and use it to define a quantum measure
| · | obeying the sum rule (2). This is what is normally done, with I taken to be
what reference [9] would call (twice the real part of) the “decoherence functional”.
The postulate that quantum probabilities should be derived from such a bi-additive
function can thus be replaced by the assumption that they obey the fundamental
sum-rule (2).
For completeness, let me conclude this section by sketching the way that
the ordinary non-relativistic quantum mechanics of point particles fits into this
framework [4]. Also, since none of our discussion has attempted to address the
measure-theoretic technicalities associated with continuous spaces of histories, let
me pretend that the set of all possible particle paths has finite cardinality. Then
the measure of any set A = {x, y, · · · , z} of paths can be formally expressed as
|A| = “(1/2)I(x+y+ · · · z, x+y+ · · · z)”, which is to be evaluated by expanding out
the sums via bilinearity and interpreting I(x, y) as I({x}, {y}). To complete the con-
struction we must take I(x, y) to be essentially e−iS(x)eiS(y)+(complex conjugate),
where S(x) is the Action of the path x.
Actually the true expression is somewhat more complicated than this, and
requires the introduction of a “truncation time” T lying to the future of the span of
time to which the properties defining A refer [4]. The actual rule then involves paths
truncated to time T , and the expression for I(x, y) acquires a delta-function which
“ties together” the final endpoints of the truncated paths. With the convention
that x and y now represent such truncated paths, |A| is given finally as the sum
over all x and y belonging to A of the expression,
I(x, y) = δ(x(T ), y(T )) e−iS(x)eiS(y) + (complex conjugate).
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The import of this rule can also be rendered by the statement that the measure |A|
of a set of trajectories is the norm-squared of the wave function which is produced
at time T by restricting the path-sum to the set of paths belonging to A. This last
statement is recognizably the standard quantum probability rule, as expressed in
sum-over-histories language.
Final remarks on interpretation and some open questions
Although we have succeeded in tracing the main traits of the quantum formal-
ism to the fundamental sum-rule (2) for the quantum measure, we have only raised,
without settling, the question of how this measure or “quantum probability” is to
be interpreted physically. That question entrains far too many issues for a short
manuscript to deal with, but the present paper would be incomplete without at
least some indication of an answer.
With a frequency interpretation of the measure unavailable, it is natural to
adopt the attitude that locates the predictive content of a (classical or quantum)
probabilistic theory in the assertion that events of sufficiently small measure, for all
practical purposes, do not occur at all: they are precluded events in the language
of [10]. The meaning of the measure, then, would be that the true history will
not (or “almost never”) belong to a precluded set A. The trouble with this rule is
that, if used without the requisite tact, it leads to mutually conflicting predictions.
In Feynman’s well-known exposition of the two-slit experiment, for example, the
partition of the histories which properly comes into play depends on what question
we are asking, and not all questions can be simultaneously valid. Here, asking
a question is not something “mental”, but something “material” like putting a
detector in place, and paradox is avoided because the questions leading to conflicting
preclusions are not all realizable within a single experiment.
However satisfactory such a resolution might be for most practical purposes,
it threatens to bring back the same subjectivity and human-centeredness which
all along we have been at pains to reject. We can retain objectivity, I believe,
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by abstracting from the idea of measurement the idea of correlation, and limiting
the application of preclusion to situations where an appropriate type of correlation
occurs. Briefly, the idea is that, when variables pertaining to spacelike-separated
regions become correlated (in the sense that the correlation-breaking possibilities
correspond to sets of histories of small or zero measure), then the failure of the
correlation is precluded. (For example, if one of a pair of electrons with anti-
correlated spins traverses the “σz = +1” beam of a Stern-Gerlach analyzer, then
the other must traverse the “σz = −1” beam of its analyzer, assuming these events
are spacelike separated.) Moreover, we predict in such a situation that, if one of
the correlated possibilities P is itself of negligible measure, then it also is precluded
(i.e. we predict that the true history almost certainly does not belong to P ). Notice
that these predictions are statements about the history itself, not just about “what
we would find if we observed the variables in question”.
The double predictive principle just enunciated seems to suffice for using quan-
tum mechanics in the way we use it, without leading to any obvious contradictions.
Unfortunately it does lead to some unobvious contradictions, but all those that I
know of can be excluded by a small refinement of the predictive scheme. The refine-
ment in question, and further details of the resulting prescription will be discussed
in another place [8]. Here there is space only to raise a few further questions which
are naturally suggested by the preceding development.
The first question is whether some further axiom of general validity can or
should be added to our basic sum-rule (2). It is a feature of standard quantum
mechanics (and also of classical probability theory) that the measure of a set of
histories A is unaltered when a disjoint set of measure zero is adjoined to it; in
particular the union of two disjoint sets of measure zero will also have zero measure.
Since this property is natural, and turns out to be important for the analysis of
reference [8], it appears reasonable to adopt it as a further condition on the measure
| · |. (For a related proposal in the language of “decoherence” see [11].)
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A second question is whether there is a sense in which a process governed by
quantum measure theory can be called Markovian. With the idea of amplitude
not taken for granted, it is not obvious that the answer is yes, but if it is, then it
would be interesting to find necessary and sufficient conditions in terms of I(·, ·)
for a quantum measure to be Markovian. Such conditions ought to clarify what
makes ordinary quantum mechanics special among possible solutions of (2), and
might suggest novel generalizations of Hamiltonian evolution as well.
A third question is whether the introduction of the “truncation time” T in the
previous section was really needed. In the classical theory of stochastic processes,
such a truncation of the histories is unnecessary, and the similarity of that theory to
the present formulation offers hope of avoiding it in “quantum stochastic mechanics”
as well. Success in this could be crucial for quantum gravity, which lacks any
background time with respect to which truncation could be carried out (see however
[4]).
The asking of these last two questions highlights the fact that not all of the
somewhat elaborate details of the construction of I(A,B) in the previous section
are included in the simple sum-rule (2). Some of them are related instead to the
Markovian character of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, and beyond that, to the
unitary evolution it embodies. However, non-unitary and non-Markovian evolution
is the rule in open systems (e.g. systems coupled to “reservoirs”), so that the
greater generality of what we have here called “quantum measure theory” already
has important application. Moreover, it appears unlikely that unitarity will have
fundamental meaning for quantum gravity, and one may suspect that something at
least as general as full quantum measure theory will be needed for that theory, if
not some still more general dynamical framework, perhaps corresponding to one of
the higher sum rules described in this paper.
Finally, let us return for a moment to the three-slit experiment with which we
began. If some more general form of dynamics than quantum mechanics is at work
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in nature, it should show itself in a failure of the sum rule (2) for which the three-slit
discussion is a prototype. Thus, any situation in which three distinct alternatives
can interfere offers a potential “null test” of the validity of quantum mechanics. It
might be worthwhile looking for experimentally realizable situations of this type
where, unlike with ordinary diffraction, the satisfaction of the test is not already a
foregone conclusion.
In conclusion, I would like to thank the participants in the Syracuse Relativity
Tea for stimulating comments on these topics, and R.B. Salgado in particular for
suggesting the most appropriate formulation of the lemma utilized above. This
research was partly supported by NSF grant PHY 9307570.
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